Lessons learned from the implementation of Total Quality Management at the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, CA. by Warmington, Jeffery Allen
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1988
Lessons learned from the implementation of Total
Quality Management at the Naval Aviation Depot,
North Island, CA.
Warmington, Jeffery Allen











Lessons Learned fron the Inplerentation of
Total Quality Management at the Naval




Thesis Advisor: E. N. Hart





)• REPORT SECURITY CiASSif iC AT-ON
Unclassified
lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2» SECURITY CLASSifiCATiON au'hQRiIy
2b DECLASSIFICATION 'DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DlSTRIBUTION/AVAILABILIJY^QF REPOR,r
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
he ADDRESS (C'ty. Stitt. »nd ZiPCoOt)
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (Ofy. SUtt. »nd ZIP Cod*)
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









1 1 TITLE (inOudt Setu'iry C/*u<^c*t(on)
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TOTAL QUALI'^ MANAGEMENT AT THE NA\/?L AVXATICN
DEPOT, NORTH ISLAND CA UNCLASSIFIED
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Warmington, Jeffery A.








16 SUPPLEMENT ARv NoiATiof, The views ejqDressed m this tnesis are tnose or tne aumor ant
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U. S. rkDvemment
17 COSAli CODfJ
FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP
16 SuBJtCi TERMS (Confmue on reverse i1 nKeusry and identify by b/ock number}
Total Quality Management, Statistical Proc:ess Control
Dr. Deming's Management Principles
19 ABSTRACT {Continut on rtvrne if nffeistry snd identify by block number)
. .
Total Quality Managenent {TQA) has been presented as a way to irrprove productivity
at Departnent of Defense installations. There are many obsticles to the successful
inplorentation of TO^ in a military organization. This thesis defines TTM. It documents
the iiTplemsntation of TQM at the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, San Diego, California.
It presents the lessons learned during the implementation, recanmendations for further
iitplenentation and doronstrates that any organization can benefit fran T^ philosophies.
20 DISTRIBUTION 'AVAILABILIT* '.h AflSIRACT
D UNCLASSiFlED'UNUMlTED SCSAMEASRPT DOTlC USERS
?^ ABSTRACT SE.LUi«nJr CLASSIFICATION
uhclassiried
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE iNO viDuAl
E. N. Hart
22b TELEPHONE (/nc/ocr* Are* Code) 22c OFflCE SYMBOL
^dm^
ODFORM 1473.8a MAR B j AMH edition rna^ De u\ea untn einaoiteo
All oth?f editioni are obsolete
SECUR'TY CLASSiFICAT!ON_Of iHlLfAGi.
J^^-^-assified
• U t Co«»rf>mt"l •»H»lln» nUln !»•—to* f«
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Lessons Learned from the Implementation of Total Quality
Management at the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, CA
by
Jeffery Allen Warmington
Lieutenant Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1977
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT
from the
ABSTRACT
Total Quality Management (TQM) has been presented as a way
to improve productivity at Department of Defense
installations. There are many obstacles to the successful
implementation of TQM in a military organization. This
thesis defines TQM. It documents the implementation of TQM
at the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, San Diego,
California. It presents the lessons learned during the
implementation, recommendations for further implementation,
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This thesis will investigate the area of quality control.
Total Quality Management (TQM) has been adopted as the new
quality control method at a number of Government and
commercial establishments. It will familiarize the reader
with the aspects of, the potential uses of, and the lessons
learned at selected establishments during the implementation
of TQM.
The reader should gain an insight into the potential of
TQM at any establishment and recognize the possible benefits
and pitfalls that could be expected during its
implementation.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to familiarize the reader
with Total Quality Management and how it might be
implemented. Lessons learned during its implementation at
various installations can be applied to those activities
intending to use the concept.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary research question: Can Total Quality Management
(TQM) theories be successfully implemented within DoD and the
major defense contractors?
Subsidiary questions:
1. What is TQM?
2. In what areas has TQM been implemented within DoD?
3. To what extent has its implementation been
successful?
4. How can the experience gained by DoD activities
using TQM be applied to other DoD activities and to the
major defense contractors?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
There is a general consensus that the quality of material
procured for use by the DoD could be improved. Numerous
legislative attempts have been made to require improvements
in the quality of products received from vendors. This paper
will be restricted to an area relatively untouched by recent
legislative attempts; that of Total Quality Management, or
what is commonly referred to as the "Japanese style of
Quality Control."
TQM will be described, from its inception and history, to
its use and successes in both Japanese and American
establishments. Elements within the Naval Air Systems
Command have attempted to implement TQM. Their experiences
will be identified and the extent of their successes will be
evaluated.
A case- study style approach will be used. The area of
concentration will be the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island,
California.
The reader should be able to adapt the strategies used and
the lessons learned to meet their own implementation needs.
While it is not intended that this paper be used as a
"cookbook" approach to the implementation of a philosophy as
encompassing and important as TQM, it is expected that the
reader can implement TQM much more smoothly by adhering to
the recommendations and procedures discussed in this thesis.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
A basic literature search was conducted by the author
including the local library and personal literature and
publications held by the author. Additional literature was
obtained from various TQM training courses and other personal
libraries. The literature search was conducted to
familiarize the author with the basic philosophy underlying
the TQM principles and to gain insight into the
implementation problems. Personal interviews were conducted
to gain precise information regarding the problems associated
with TQM implementation at the various levels. Key
operational personnel were interviewed as well as middle and
upper management, where available.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This research effort is organized into five chapters.
Chapter I is a broad introduction presenting the overall
objectives and methodology of the study. Chapter II provides
a background and familiarization to the TQM philosophy and
principles. Chapter III contains a review of the
implementation of TQM from an operational level. The Naval
Aviation Depot at North Island, California has been chosen
for this purpose. Chapter IV contains conclusions.
II. WHAT IS TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT?
A. BACKGROUND
Total Quality Management (TQM) is an alternative to the
present quality control philosophy. TQM is a combination of
statistical process control and management principles.
Statistical process control was introduced by Dr. Walter
Shewhart while working in New York City at the Bell Telephone
Laboratories. Dr W. Edwards Deming developed the philosophy
further and applied it in the industrial reconstruction of
post-war Japan. Dr. Deming is so revered and respected in
Japan for his contributions, the Japanese Scientist and
Engineers (J.U.S.E.) present the Deming Medal each year to
the Japanese company with the most outstanding achievement in
quality control. Dr. Kaoru Ishikawa recognized the
potential of statistical process control during one of Dr.
Deming' s many instructional visits to Japan. He wrote the
Guide to Quality Control which has been utilized for both
self-study and classroom training. In the Guide to Quality
Control , Dr. Ishikawa describes statistical process control
and the purpose for collecting data.
The manufacturing procedure will be most effective if a
proper evaluation is made, and on-the-job data are
essential for making a proper evaluation. ( Ishikawa, p.
14)
The gathering of data and its subsequent analysis are the
foundation of statistical process control. For example, a
machine that extrudes copper wire with a nominal size of 32
thousandths of an inch. Random measurements of the extruded
wire will provide valuable information as to the actual size
the machine produces at given settings. A properly
maintained machine will normally produce wire of a thickness
that is symmetrically distributed around the nominal
thickness. See Table 1:










Source: Developed by researcher
The statistical description of the data reveals the
actual mean of the machine as 30.88 thousandths of an inch
with a standard deviation of 5.54 thousandths. If the
sampled data are assumed to be normally distributed,
measurements will be between 19.8 and 41.96 thousandths
95.44% of the time.
This information is valuable in describing the
characteristics of the extruding machine. The information is
useless however, if it is not compared with some standard.
If, for example, a buyer had the need for copper wire with
nominal thickness of 32 thousandths of an inch, the owner of
the above machine would surely believe his machine could
supply the required wire. If the buyer had failed to
communicate that the requiring process could not tolerate
wire of less than 27 thousandths or more than 37 thousandths,
he could expect wire purchased to be within those tolerances
only 60 % of the time. The extruding machine in the above
example is not capable of producing wire that meets the
requirement in its present condition. However, it may meet
the need of a process requiring less accuracy. A buyer armed
with the statistical information, such as that given in the
above example, could certainly make a better purchase
decision than one merely based on raw output from machinery.
The owner of the machinery could also benefit from the
statistical control process. Machine variances increase with
age and time between maintenance. Information gained from
data collection can be used as an indication of an out of
control machine. If information collected from random
sampling produces distributions that are not normal, external
factors influencing those variances could be identified.
External factors may be:
1. A change in the machine setting.
2. A change in the input raw material
3. A change in temperature surrounding the machine
4. A machine in need of maintenance
B. CONTROL CHARTS
The collection of data, however, is not enough. It must
also be studied and analyzed against historical data.
This means that we not only have to see what changes in
data occur over time; we must also study the impact of
the various factors in the process that change over time.
Thus, if the materials, workers, or working methods or
equipment were to change during this time, we would have
to note the effect of such change on
production. ( I shikawa, p. 38)
Dr. Ishikawa proposes the use of control charts for
visually displaying data and tracking performance. There are
various types of control charts depending on the nature of
the process and the type of data collected. Where the
process and data collection techniques permit measurement of
output such as volume, product weight, power consumed, or
product length or thickness as in the above example, the X-R
chart is commonly used.
An X-R control chart is one that shows both the mean
value, X and the range, R. The X portion of the chart
mainly shows any changes in the mean value of the
process, while the R portion shows any changes in the
dispersion of the process. This chart is particularly
useful because it shows changes in mean value and
dispersion of the process at the same time making it a
very effective method for checking abnormalities on the
process. ( Ishikawa, p. 124)
When the process is better measured by counting the
number of defective items, a pn and p chart should be used.
"A p chart is one that shows the fraction defective, whereas
a pn chart shows the number of defectives" .( Ishikawa, p. 156)
Regardless of the process, collection techniques, or
types of control charts used, the unique characteristics of a
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production run may be known. The benefits to both the plant
manager and the buyer of the product are obvious. Control
charting enables the plant manager to identify areas of
concern regarding the production process. Changes in the
production process can be identified on the control chart,
allowing the manager to "see" the results of such changes.
Machines or operators can be identified as being "out of
control" and adjusted as in the earlier example, or trained
as in the case of the operator. Defective or substandard raw
material can quickly be identified and replaced or repaired
during the production run instead of sometime after the run
is complete, as would happen if normal post-production
inspection techniques were used.
The production control charts are a unique signature of
the production run lot. They can be used by consumers or
buyers of the product as well as the managers. Different
lots produced by the same process or machine can have
entirely different characteristics. For example, suppose the
copper wire extruding machine produced another lot of copper
wire resulting in an X or mean thickness of 32.3 thousandths
with a standard deviation of 2.65 thousandths of an inch.
The buyer who requires wire between 27 thousandths and 37
thousandths of an inch could now expect to receive "good"
wire from that lot 95 % of the time. The difference between
the 60 % received before adjustment and 95 % after adjustment
could be crucial to the buyer. An important aspect to
process control is that the output of one process becomes the
input of another process. The lot that contained wire within
tolerances only 60 % of the time may cause an otherwise "in
control" process to seem "out of control". Managers, even if
using statistical process control could incorrectly blame
variations in output on machines or operators. Attempts to
remedy the problem through machine adjustments could only
compound the variances since the machine was not in need of
adjustment. The operator, too, could feel frustration if
every attempt to correct the problem by machine adjustment
simply lead to greater variances in output. Management needs
the tools to allow identification and correction of the
actual cause of variations.
The importance the buyer plays in this scenario cannot be
overlooked. While the machine operator could not
successfully control the output of his machine, the buyer
could have improved the entire process by knowing more about
the wire he was buying. If the buyer received the production
control charts from the supplier when he received the
material, the characteristics of the material would be known
and further inspection would not be necessary. Many
companies, and DoD, use receipt inspectors to ensure the
qpaality of incoming material. With the use of control
charts, however, the need for quality inspection for incoming
material is often reduced. Futhermore, if control charts
were included in the material deliveries, machines could be
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adjusted to accommodate different raw material lots before
the material was introduced into the process.
The overall savings from the elimination of unneeded
inspectors, reduction in scrap materials and defective items
reworked, coupled with the ability to produce items with
less variance significantly increase the overall
competitiveness of the vendor.
The fundamental precept taught to the Japanese in the
1950s by Dr. Deming is that building quality into a
product brings lower cost and hence improvements in
productivity and competitive position. This is an idea
that the greater part of American management has not been
able to understand, mainly because their concept of
quality control has been one of sorting out the bad from
the good. (Mann, p. 32)
C. MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
In his book Quality, Productivity and Competitive
Position , Dr. Deming presented his fourteen principles for
management. The principles cover a wide range of management
theory. Principle number one is:
Create consistency of purpose . Problems of today
encompass maintenance of quality of product put out
today, regulation of output not to exceed too far
immediate sales, budget, employment, profits, sales,
service, public relations
,
forecasting, etc .... Problems
of the future command first and foremost consistency of
purpose and dedication to improvement of competitive
position to keep the company alive.
Principle number two is:
Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new economic age.
We can no longer live with commonly accepted levels of
mistakes, defects, material not suited for the job,
people on the job that do not know what their job is and
are afraid to ask, handling damage, failure of management
to understand their job, antiquated methods of training
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on the job, inadequate and ineffective supervision.
Principle number three is:
Cease dependence on mass inspection. Routine 100%
inspection is the same thing as planning for defects,
acknowledgement that the process can not make the product
correctly or the specifications made no sense in the
first place.
The example of the copper wire machine demonstrated that
with the benefit of control charts, inspection is not needed
for most items. Inspectors that would normally be checking
incoming material could better serve the company by
preforming sampling and process control tasks within the
process itself. A receipt control clerk would only need to
verify the lot number of the material and the lot number on
the enclosed control charts to know if the material met the
specifications of the contract. With proper elementary
training, buyers and receipt clerks could include statistical
control information on procurements and rely on the control
charts for the acceptance of material. It would become easy
for the personnel to recognize the mean and variation of the
required material. In the above example, a clerk should have
recognized that the first lot of wire would not be able to
meet the requirements while the second lot would.
The underlying precept of process control is visual,
easy-to-see, control points during the production process.
To the Japanese, quality is the responsibility of the
production worker, the production supervisor, and even the
production department head, not something assigned to a
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quality control department. The achievement of a quality
goal is often used as the basis for production bonuses. The
Japanese understand that productive output, as measured in
quality, can be affected by many factors not controllable by
the production department or even the individual production
worker. If the production process is designed correctly,
however, the worker can directly influence the quality of the
output. The Japanese visually display process control
charts, not to intimidate the workers, but as an incentive
and source of pride.
Display boards are everywhere in Japanese plants.
They tell the workers, the bosses, the customers, and the
outside visitors what quality factors are measured, what
the recent performance is, what the current quality
improvements projects are, who has won awards for
quality, and so forth. Some displays are lighted
electronic devices, resembling basketball scoreboards-
which call for help when there are quality
problems. (Shonberger, p. 48)
Quality, in Japan, is a very visual concept. Everyone
can see the results of poor quality and its associated costs,
so can they see the benefits of producing high quality.
Recently, that concept has been translated into programs
where the Japanese measure defects, not in per cents (defects
per 100), but in the number of defects per million items
produced! The Japanese take pride in producing high quality
material and the visibility of their quality control programs
are one of the reasons. The significant gains by the
Japanese in traditionally American markets should serve as an
indication that their quality programs are successful.
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American companies continue to create slogans saying that
"Quality is Job One" or "The Quality Goes in Before the Name
Goes On", but persist on keeping secret the actual measures
of quality and their actual results. The reliance on
inspections and the tendency to keep the results secret are
primary reasons why there is no confidence in American
quality.
Accept the inadequacy of inspections for critical parts.
Inspection will never do the job--it never has. It's the
afterthought that is necessary when the vendor doesn't
have the manufacturing process under control and cannot
provide consistent quality. Purchase quality control.
Statistical charts, along with records of action taken,
must accompany your purchased materials and goods. There
is no other way of purchasing to know what it or the
vendor is doing. (Gottlieb)
By insisting on control charts with every material
contract, DoD can assume the lead role in increasing the
quality in the American industrial base. As contractors see
the benefits of using process control and control charts,
they will begin using them for their commercial items as well
as those they produce for the DoD. Since DoD is the largest
source of procurement and has the right to dictate many
policies that would not be tolerated in a commercially
competitive environment, it is in the position to demand
higher quality--and get it. The area to improve cost savings
is in the production of high quality material. As quality
goes up, so does productivity. As productivity goes up,
prices go down. One of the great misconceptions surrounding
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quality is that increased quality requires increased costs.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Why is it that productivity increases as quality
improves? Less rework. There is no better answer.
Improvement of the process increases uniformity of
output, reduces rework and mistakes, reduces waste of
manpower, machine-time, and materials, and thus increases
output with less effort. Other benefits of improved
quality are lower costs, better competitive position, and
happier people on the job, and more jobs, through better
competitive position of the company. (Deming, p. 12)
The current procurement regulations require, for the most
part, that DoD procurements go to the lowest bidder. Any
attempt by a company to improve quality and productivity in
the long run would result in lost revenues and could even
threaten the company's existence in the short run. This
economic fact leads to Dr. Deming' s fourth principle for
management.
Dr. Deming 's fourth management principle is:
End the practice of awarding business on price tag
alone
.
We can no longer leave quality, service, and
price to the forces of competition for price - not in
todays requirements for uniformity and reliability.
Price has no meaning without a measure of the quality
being purchased. Without adequate measures of quality,
business drifts to the lowest bidder, low quality and high
cost being the inevitable results. American industry and
the U.S. Government, civil and military, are being rooked
by rules that award business to the lowest bidder.
The fifth management principle deals with a continual
improvement of the system:
Constantly and forever improve the system of
production and service. This means continual reduction
of waste and continual improvement in quality of every
activity: procurement, transportation, engineering,
methods, maintenance, location of activities, instruments
and measures, sales, methods of distribution, accounting,
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payroll, service to customers. Continual improvement of
quality brings continual rise in productivity.
Dr. Deming's sixth principle deals with training of the
workers
:
Institute modern methods of training on the job.
Training must be totally reconstructed. Poor training of
hourly workers, or none at all, and dependance on
unintelligible printed instructions, seem to be a way of
life. Sweeping changes are necessary. Statistical
methods must be used to learn when training is finished.
The seventh principle involves methods of supervision:
Institute modern methods of supervision. Supervision
belongs to the system and is the responsibility of
management.
The eighth principle deals with fear in the workplace:
Drive out fear. Most people on a job, especially
people in management positions, do not understand what
the job is, nor what is right or wrong. Moreover, it is
not clear to them how to find out. Many of them are
afraid to ask a question or to take a position. The
economic loss from fear is appalling. It is necessary,
for better quality and productivity, that people feel
secure.
The ninth principle of management deals with the barriers
that build up between staff areas and the production areas:
Break down barriers between staff areas. People in
research, design, purchase of materials, sales, receipt
of incoming materials, must learn about the problems
encountered with various materials in production and
assembly. Otherwise, there will be losses in production
from the necessity for rework caused by attempts to use
materials unsuited for the purpose.
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The tenth management principle covers the use of numerical
production goals and the use of slogans:
Eliminate numerical goals for the work force.
Eliminate targets, slogans, pictures, posters, for the
work force, urging them to increase productivity, sign
their work as a self-portrait, etc. What is needed is
not exhortations but a road map to improvement,
management's obligation.
Dr Deming's eleventh principle states:
Eliminate work standards and numerical cpjotas. These
quotas take account only of numbers, not c[uality. A work
standard is a fortress against improvement of quality and
productivity.
The twelfth principle deals with the barriers that the
hourly worker faces every day:
Remove barriers that hinder the hourly worker. The
hourly worker in America is under handicaps that are
taking a terrific toll in quality, productivity, and
competitive position. Barriers and handicaps rob the
hourly worker of his birthright, the right to be proud of
his work, the right to do a good job. . . .Only management
can remove these barriers.
The thirteenth principle of the Deming philosophy is:
Institute a vigorous program of education and
training. Management has a new job; so has everybody
else .... Education and training will fit people into new
jobs and new responsibilities. So-called quality control
departments must adjust themselves to new
responsibilities.
The fourteenth principle includes the challenge to upper
management to create an atmosphere that will foster the other
13 points:
Create a structure in top management that will push
every day on the above 13 points . Top management will
require guidance from an experienced consultant, but the
consultant can not take on obligations that only
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management can carry out. Part of his duties would be to
teach statistical methods and to develop teachers.
D. APPLICATION OF DEMING'S PRINCIPLES
Japan embraced the management principles presented by Dr.
Deming. The Japanese concepts of Just-in-time, Total Quality
Management, and Statistical Process Control were actually
developed from Deming' s principles. All of the Japanese
concepts stress the importance of developing a small number
of suppliers. By having a small number of suppliers for a
given commodity, it is possible to work with the vendors and
even contribute to the design of the desired product. Under
the Total Quality Management/Statistical Process Control
methods, the item to be produced, the quality control system,
and the production process are all designed simultaneously.
This recognizes the belief that quality can only be built
into a product, it can never be inspected in after the
production process is complete.
Managers in Japan realize that control of the process
involves control of suppliers. They know that for process
control to work in their plants, their suppliers must use
process control as well.
At Kawasaki's Nebraska plant, quality control
inspectors do perform receiving inspections, but only for
parts and material purchased from U.S. suppliers. Sixty-
five percent of Kawasaki's street bike parts are shipped
from Kawasaki, Japan, mostly in lots of 200, but those
lots are not inspected. Since Kawasaki, Japan employs
rigid process control, the parts it makes for export to
Nebraska can be counted on to be of exceptional quality,
so that they need not be inspected. ( Shonberger, p. 210)
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They can do this for two reasons. The first is that the
supplier uses process control techniques. The second is
because they have developed reliable single sources for their
supplies. If they had been awarding their business based on
the lowest bid, they would not have been receiving consistent
material and would have had to inspect every part before it
went into production. The Japanese do not disdain
competition, as may be implied by the above discussion. They
rely on competition to chose the best supplier. The
difference is that the Japanese develop suppliers from early
competitive proposals. Suppliers know that the competition
is for the entire length of the requirement and so they are
very anxious to be the winner. As opposed to American
competitions which are for one delivery or one years supply
only, the Japanese competitions are for the life of the
product. At the time a winner is selected in a Japanese
competition, the subject of price may not have even entered
the discussion. Profit margins are expected to be normal for
the item being produced. If, however, the supplier proves
that they cannot control costs or cannot meet the quality
requirements of the buying company, the supplier will lose
that business permanently.
All of the Deming principles discussed go hand-in-hand.
It is not enough to institute one or two of the principles
and believe the job is complete. Developing single sources
of supplies is only one of Deming' s principles. It should be
19
apparent that price is not the sole determining factor for
source selection. While price is always a consideration, it
is rarely used as the only deciding factor in normal
purchases. Average consumers rarely use price alone to
determine their purchases. If that were not true, only the
cheapest car, the cheapest toaster, or the cheapest clothing
would ever be bought. Consumers use a combination of price,
quality, and suitability for the intended purpose as major
decision factors. They realize that what might have the
lowest price tag can cost more in the future in higher repair
bills or higher operating costs. The item purchased by price
tag alone may not even be able to perform the task for which
it was purchased adequately and, therefore, was a complete
waste of money.
For buyers that translates to:
* Don't trade nickels for quality goods
* Don't rely on mass inspections
* Insist on evidence of quality through control charts
from every vendor
* Work with fewer vendors. First find one good
supplier, then you can look for more. (Gottlieb)
Government buyers need to adopt practices employed by
successful commercial activities. While it is understood
that Congress uses DoD procurement practices to achieve
numerous socio-economic goals, the primary goal of a viable
defense at a reasonable price must not be overlooked. If DoD
can make better use of its funds through productivity and
quality gains, the socio-economic goals can be met more
indirectly. DoD can establish long-term relationships with
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disadvantaged companies or companies in distressed areas and
assist them in establishing process control methods. Once
the company has improved its competitive position through the
use of process control, it can take its place in the economy
as a quality leader. Under this philosophy, the Government
could achieve its socio-economic goal and develop a source
for high quality material at the same time. As DoD
encourages more and more companies to adopt process control
methods, the companies can be placed on a Qualified Suppliers
List. Companies on the Qualified Suppliers List could be
given contracts automatically when requirements arise. The
use of the lists would reduce procurement time and eliminate
the need for routine inspection.
Typically, an industrial company will keep a list of
qualified suppliers that have maintained historically
high standards of product quality and reliability. As
long as these standards are maintained, industrial buyers
do not require exhaustive inspection, and thereby save
expense on both sides. Suppliers are highly motivated to
get - and stay - on lists of qualified suppliers by




Although the preceding discussion has been focused on the
production or manufacturing applications, the TQM philosophy
is also applicable to administration and clerical quality
problems. The main determining factor in assessing whether
or not the philosophy can provide benefit to a process is to
determine if the process includes sources and customers. The
sources and suppliers may be different organizations,
different sections within a single organization, or even
21
different work stations within a single section. The product
may be a machined part, the application of paint to a
manufactured item or even a travel voucher, as will be
demonstrated in later chapters.
Since TQM has a variety of applications, the installation
selected for this research was specifically selected for its
diversity in purpose and internal requirements. As various
processes are presented and various lessons learned are
identified, visualize each one as the wire extruding machine
presented earlier. The control procedures and statistical
process charts will apply equally well to all of them.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF TQM AT NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT,
NORTH ISLAND, CALIFORNIA
A. BACKGROUND
The Naval Aviation Depot at North Island, San Diego
California, hereafter referred to as the Depot, the NADEP, or
the conunand, is a large industrial facility that repairs and
overhauls aircraft, engines, and avionics for the Navy and
other Services.
The largest of six similar facilities located in the
United States, it employs 4750 civilians and 27 military
personnel. With an annual operating budget of 360
million dollars, the Depot produces approximately 100
aircraft, 600 engines, and 40,000 various aircraft
components in any given year
.
(Loisell and Silverman, p.
16)
The Depot began the TQM implementation process in 1980,
when, in an effort to improve its production performance
reputation, several high level managers attended a seminar
given by Dr. Deming. These managers began the process by
convincing some of their peers of the merits of TQM.
Although some of the managers were impressed by the prospects
of TQM and its promised productivity improvements, the
organization was not convinced that TQM was really needed,
A familiar phrase often heard at a repair depot is "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it". It is felt that the period of
stagnation between the initial exposure of TQM in 1980 and
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its adoption in 1984 was due to the reluctance of management
to believe the present system actually needed "fixing".
In June of 1984, the group of people who supported
Deming's philosophy
...approached the Commanding Officer (CO) and the
Executive Policy Board (EPB) of the Depot with a proposal
to develop an implementation plan. This proposal was
approved and the entire EPB (19 members) took
responsibility for developing this implementation plan
for TQM at North Island. ( Loisell and Silverman, p. 18)
Thus began Phase I of the implementation of TQM at the
Depot at North Island. Phase I can be characterized as one
of general training and exposure to the TQM philosophy. The
training, however, was generally limited to upper and middle
management. Exposure to TQM at the first- line supervisor and
worker level was limited to what was passed down by the upper
management and by the observance of a single prototype
process improvement project that had been established.
The EPB chose a troublesome manufacturing process and
a group of divisional managers and shop employees were
assembled to thoroughly examine the process and make
recommendations to the EPB for corrective action. Navy
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC)
personnel developed a training curriculum and
administered required training for the group. (Bolt, p.
19)
The area chosen to participate in a prototype
implementation included plating and grinding functions.
Included in the study was the physical movement of parts from
one area to another and the specifications to which they were
being worked.
Basically the reason for the enormous defect
rate(70%) was the fact that the grinding shop was using
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three or four different specifications (all of which were
legitimate) in their pre-plating procedure, while the
plating shop was using only one specification for
plating, regardless of the size of the pin when it was
received. (APC 53, p. 4)
The initial implementation phase lasted until August of
1985, when an outside consultant was brought in to measure
the progress achieved and provide recommendations for further
improvement.
Even though the initial implementation was conducted on a
very small section within the Depot, there were problems with
the internal communications and decision processes.
The EPB learned that the full board was too large and
indecisive to implement the TQM program. The board
realized that the feedback from the prototype group was
inadequate and needed improvement in the full
implementation. The EPB also realized that a group of




It is at this point in the process where the management
of the Depot falls ill to what Deming calls the number one
crippling disease; lack of constancy of purpose. The EPB had
assumed responsibility for the implementation of TQM in June
of 1984. Yet 14 months later they had lost the collective
will to expand the implementation beyond the prototype stage.
By removing themselves as the controlling body of the
process, the board was able to "return to the problems at
hand" thereby delegating the responsibility of TQM
implementation to a staff organization.
The Depot, being a military organization, is faced with a
constantly rotating upper management. The Commanding Officer
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and Executive Officer normally remain four years. The
remainder of the upper level military officers remain only
three years which translates to a 30 percent turnover per
year. The EPB consists of the military officers plus
civilian Department Heads who provide corporate consistency
in the face of high military turnover. It is believed that
the consistency sought from the civilian Department Heads
during normal operations actual provided an impediment to
change in the case of TQM implementation. It is felt that
the EPB acted correctly and responsibly in 1984 when it
assumed the leadership role in TQM implementation. It is
further felt that the EPB reached a correct conclusion when
they deemed themselves too large and indecisive to implement
the TQn the command view the EPB as the controlling and
influencing force. Transferring the responsibility of TQM
implementation from that body to a newly created staff
organization sent the signal to the command that the EPB "has
more important issues" to deal with. Personal interviews
with first-line supervisors revealed the belief that they
were "...under two separate chains of command. The normal
chain of command and the TQM chain of command. "( Supervisors
interview)
In addition to the above problems during Phase I of
implementation, the command identified two others. First,
"...while the prototype effort was going on, the remainder of
the plant ignored the TQM program. .
.
, and "Finally, a group
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of in-house facilitators would be needed to train and assist




The Depot entered Phase II of implementation when they
created a "TQM Organization".
The ESC's (Executive Steering Committee) initial plan
(in September 1985) focused on process improvement. It
called for the formation of a facilitator group. Process
Action Teams (PATs) consisting of artisans and first-line
supervisors, and Quality Management Boards (QMBs) to
serve as boundary spanning organizations between the PATs
and the ESC. (Loisell and Silverman, p. 19)
The initial success of the newly formed PATs encouraged
the ESC to nearly double the effort merely five months after
the beginning of Phase II. This period of time saw a
dramatic increase in the number of PATs and facilitators.
In October, 1985 the ESC selected eight in-house
consultants and eight processed. The in-house
consultants were trained and the PATs were formed in
November. In February, an additional seven processes
were selected by the ESC for PAT action because of the
excellent progress made by the original eight. (Bolt, p.
21)
Phase II ended in July, 1986 when the EPB reviewed the
progress achieved by the individual PATs and the extent of
implementation of TQM Depot wide. The July, 1986 progress
review identified several problems encountered throughout
Phase II. The first and most serious was a "lack of
commitment from all concerned, especially at the middle
management level ." (Bolt
,
p. 22) Very few QMBs had actually
been formed which left the PATs with no link to the ESC.
Attempts by the ESC to bridge the gap resulted in the ESC
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"...being spread too thin and any efforts were actually too
late to be truly effective.
"
(Bolt, p. 22)
Another commonly held belief was that "...expansion of
the program through the addition of the new PATs was
premature.
"
(Bolt, p. 22) It is felt that the command, in an
anxious attempt to provide results, added additional PATs
before individuals were properly trained and supported by
upper management. It is further believed that the "TQM chain
of command" was allowed to continue to grow and solidify its
position apart from the legitimate chain of command during
Phase II.
In July, 1986 the Depot invited an outside consultant,
Mr. Ron Moen, to conduct an audit of the first two phases and
provide recommendations for improvement. Mr. Moen is a long-
time TQM and Deming advocate. He has over 20 years
experience as a teacher, manager, and consultant to business,
industry, and the Government. Mr. Moen is the former
Director of Quality at the Pontiac Motor Division where he
supervised the implementation of the TQM principles.
Mr. Moen's audit consisted of personal observations of
processes, attendance of PAT, QMB and ESC meetings, and the
use of a survey to all levels of the depot. His final
recommendations included:
1. Continue TQM training and team activities. You need
a larger "critical mass." Greater focus on improving
processes. Rotating membership for ESC and
facilitators will help in the long run. Show
involvement doesn't require formal structure.
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2. Continue other training and education courses.
Continually seek to improve them. Identify
candidates for advanced statistical training (grow
your own statisticians).
3. Offer a course for supervisors. Include TQM managing
teams, counselling people skills, leadership skills
and other needs.
4. Managers - get down in there. Strong leadership not
nodding. Break down barriers between departments.
Identify your downstream customers. Balance the
workload better.
5. Develop working groups to better understand and
develop a course of action for the following:
- work standards, management by objective,
numerical goals, management by numbers
- role of inspection
- defining quality
- break down barriers between departments,
divisions and branches
- relationship with suppliers. (Moen, p. 6)
Mr Moen's recommendations became the basis for the third
phase of implementation. Phase III focused on a permanent
TQM organization with the goal of finally
"institutionalizing" the philosophy at all levels of the
command.
Two major assumptions became paramount as the plan
for expansion was developed. First, management must
accept TQM as a complete management system. No less than
full commitment is essential. Second, managers are to be
held accountable for their participation in the process.
Their participation in the process is essential and is
maintained by conducting periodic audits
.
(Bolt, p. 23)
Phase III represented an attempt to dissolve the "TQM
chain of command" and return the total management of the
organization along with the implementation of TQM to the
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"legitimate" chain of command. It is unfortunate, however,
that the EPB delegated management responsibility to lower
levels and not at their own. One positive step taken by the
EPB was to provide members to the ESC on a rotating basis.
This provided continued exposure of the implementation
process at the senior management level and also provided an
appearance of total involvement to the lower levels.
B. ANALYSIS
Senior management at the Depot is under tremendous
pressure to implement a management system that focuses on
long term productivity gains and cost reductions. They also
must continue to deal with parties only interested in short
term problems such as budget constraints, personnel cuts, and
the promise of savings from the implementation of TQM that
can make the short term goals possible. An unfortunate
reality of Government service is that productivity
improvements are often met with resistance by the people at
the implementing levels because there is the fear of being
displaced or forced to accept early retirement. The survey
conducted by Moen revealed that this fear is still present at
the depot. "...87 per cent said the amount of fear is the
same or worse than two years ago." (Moen, p. 4)
Removing fear from the organization is an integral step
in the implementation of any program. Deming says, in his
eighth point of application, that fear must be eliminated
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from the workplace if TQM is to be successful. Only through
the elimination of fear can change take place. But Deming
offers no recommendations as to how to go about making the
required changes. Lewin offers some insight into the process
of managing change. He likens change to a three step
process. The first step he calls the unfreezing phase. The
status quo must be unfrozen in the minds of the people. The
goal of unfreezing is to make people dissatisfied with the
status quo. Lewin feels that only when people are not
satisfied with the status quo will they accept change. The
second phase is the installment of the change itself. The
third and final phase is the refreezing of the organization
following the change. Refreezing reinforces the new method
as the norm of the organization. ( Stoner, p. 402)
It is felt that much of the fear that Deming and Moen
discussed could have been eliminated through the use of the
above process. Some of the fear mentioned by Deming and Moen
is the fear that existed in the organization before any
attempt was made to institute change. It is believed,
however, that a majority of the fear Moen discovered in his
survey was the result of the implementation of a system
completely foreign to most. They viewed TQM as a threat to
the way they had been doing business for years. They were
afraid of losing their positions of power and since they did
not understand TQM, they would not be included in the new TQM
organization.
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In spite of the fear and problems cited above, the Depot
continues to show that TQM is working and should continue to
work once implementation is continued. The Depot has shown
productivity gains in almost every area where implementation
has occurred. Gains in productivity have been identified in
the internal processing of Beneficial Suggestions, an
employee feedback and idea processing plan. Savings in
excess of $24,000 have been identified as being directly
related to the PAT that was formed to improve the
process. (NADEP, p. 17)
In addition to gains in productivity in the
administrative area, tremendous gains have been made in the
management of the overhaul of F-14 fighter aircraft. The
implementation of TQM in the F-14 overhaul process has been
credited with a reduction in labor expenditures that averaged
3050 hours per aircraft and an additional savings in material
expenditures that averaged $100,000 per aircraft. Total
fiscal year 1988 savings in the F-14 overhaul process was
estimated to be $673 , 000. (NADEP, p. 18)
An example of productivity gains involving entities
external to the command include the handling of bulk and junk
mail within the command. A PAT was formed in an attempt to
reduce the manhours spent in sorting and delivering the
voluminous amount of bulk and junk mail and the unsolicited
magazines and sales brochures received at the command daily.
Process improvements included requiring repeat companies to
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limit the number of copies sent to the command and addressing
them only to the Commanding Officer. The process was
improved to a point where total manhours spent on the
handling of bulk and junk mail was reduced by 50%. That
reduction represented a total savings to the command of
$35,000 per year. (NADEP, p. 19)
The Depot should be applauded for its dollar savings and
productivity gains. They must be cautious, however, not to
fall into the trap of "instant pudding" expectations. Deming
defines "instant pudding" as the hope for quick results after
implementing a new program and calls it one of the obstacles
that stand in the way of a successful transformation. Deming
differentiates between his deadly diseases and his so called
obstacles by their ease of cure. He says obstacles "...are
easier to cure than the deadly diseases." (Deming, p. 129)
The Depot is facing pressure from its immediate superior
to produce the same short term results Deming and TQM seek to
avoid. Pressure for short term success is also being felt at
the first-line supervisor level. Personal interviews with
first-line supervisors reveal pressures from middle and upper
management for dollar savings. One individual stated they
were told to organize a PAT after certain process
improvements were completed so the results could be credited
to TQM. Another individual said statistics are being
collected only for use by upper management and not being
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The overwhelming feeling observed of the TQM facilitators
was one of frustration. As facilitators, they were highly
trained and highly motivated toward TQM implementation. They
expressed frustration, however, that implementation was being
hampered by conflicting messages from upper management.
"They tell us we must implement TQM but our BPAPS (employee
evaluations) are written just like they always
were". (Facilitators)
Deming calls the reliance on performance appraisals as a
deadly disease.
Basically, what is wrong is that the performance
appraisal or merit rating focuses on the end product, at
the end of the stream, not on the leadership of people.
This is a way to avoid the problems of people. A manager
becomes, in effect, a manager of defects
.
(Deming, p. 102)
It is no wonder that the supervisors are confused. How
can management tell them to do one thing but evaluate their
performance on something else? How can anyone measure
productivity gains in the short term? In an apparent attempt
to increase the pace of TQM implementation. .. "Each department
was tasked to pick five additional processes that they wanted




It became apparent that the frustration felt by the
first-line supervisors was also being felt within the EPB.
It is believed that requiring "five additional processes" is
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very similar to the numerical goals opposed by Deming. In
addition to "eliminating work standards and numerical quotas"
(Deming, p. 40) as one of his 14 points for TQM
implementation, Deming cautions against the "Degeneration of
counting" (Deming, p. 105) as one of the deadly diseases.
Unfortunately, people that are measured by counting
are deprived of pride of workmanship. Number of designs
that an engineer turns out in a period of time would be
an example of an index that provides no chance of
workmanship. He dare not take the time to study and
amend the design just completed. To do so would decrease
his output. (Deming, p. 105)
Requiring Department Heads to submit five additional
processes for process control techniques is, in a way,
setting quotas for them. Managers could be tempted, or even
forced, to select processes at random with absolutely no
regard for those that actually need improvement the most.
The Department Heads would, in effect, be providing a product
of their own--that of selecting the best candidate for
process control. Whether the department contains only three
or as many as twenty processes cannot be determined
arbitrarily. Upper management is showing its frustration and
a return to the "old ways" by making such a requirement of
the Department Heads.
C. LESSONS LEARNED DURING IMPLEMENTATION
It is logical to take Dr. Deming' s advice on the warnings
and deadly diseases of implementation of TQM, however, it is
more difficult to actually implement it. The researcher
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experienced implementation of TQM at the Depot from 1984 to
1987. During that time the Depot saw a complete military
turnover which included the Commanding Officer, the Executive
Officer, and all senior management positions. In addition to
the military turnovers, retirements and reorganizations
caused tremendous turnover in the senior civilian positions.
In a personal interview with the researcher, the present
CO, Captain Tom O'Connor, said the greatest lesson he learned
in his three years of command at the Depot is that upper
management has the ultimate responsibility for everything
that happens in the plant; and that includes the
implementation of TQM. He inherited a command deeply
involved in the implementation of TQM. He said it was hard
to keep the focus on TQM implementation when the overhaul of
F-14 fighter aircraft, the mainstay of the Depot, was in the
process of being competed with private industry. The
oversight of the competition to retain the F-14 overhauls
within the Depot required Capt. O'Connor to be away from the
command more than a third of the days during 1987
.
(O'Connor)
Capt. O'Connor saw a major weakness in the implementation
of TQM at the Depot as having focused on the transition to
Statistical Process Control (SPC) and not providing enough
emphasis on the cultural changes required. TQM is a complete
change in management principles. SPC is only one aspect of
the overall change that is required. Deming's management
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principles must be stressed continuously to provide
understanding and meaning to SPC. (O'Connor
)
While the EPB quickly adopted TQM as their own
responsibility, they proved too large to effectively
implement it. Whether the root problem was the sheer size of
the board (19 members) or the possibility that not all
members shared the same level of commitment to TQM will
probably never be known. A group of between five and seven
members, chaired by the CO is believed to be the most
effective. This group is known as the Executive Steering
Committee (ESC) at the Depot. Membership of the ESC, in
addition to the CO, consists of the Production Officer, the
Engineering and Quality Officer, the Quality Assurance
Department Head, and the TQM Manager. The three remaining
positions are rotational and are presently filled by the
Administrative Services Department Head, the Management
Controls Department Head, and the Business Office Department
Head. EPB members who are not permanent members of the ESC
will serve on a rotating basis.
The ESC charter is to:
- provide strategic guidance to the organization
- identify major goals
- provide training resources
- monitor implementation efforts and provide status
to the EPB (NADEP, p. 12)
Some of the members of the ESC have been involved with
the implementation of TQM at the Depot almost since its
inception in 1984. They summarized lessons learned as
follows:
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1. There is a need for continuous training ar all levels
of the organization.
TQM is a very pervasive set of philosophies. Continuous
exposure to the philosophies and a greater understanding of
the power of statistics in management is essential to the
success of TQM. Old habits die hard and people are always
tempted to revert to the old methods of doing business.
Continuous training reminds people of a greater goal than
their day-to-day problems.
2. Upper and middle management must. take the lead.
TQM is a top-down procedure. Since it is a management
philosophy, it must first be adopted and supported by upper
management. Middle management and supervisors can only adopt
the new philosophy once upper management allows it to happen.
3. Improvement of processes must be quantified.
In spite of lessons to the contrary, management both
internal and external to the organization still relies on
quantified results. We still live in an environment
dominated by numbers. Rather than attempting to go "cold
turkey" on management reports and quantifiable results,
processes must be measured or baselined prior to
implementation. Only through baselining can progress be
measured and the entire program be allowed to continue.
4. There is a definite need for trained statisticians and
facilitators throughout the organization.
Very few people in the organization knew anything about
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statistics when the implementation process began. With all
the process control training going on, the teaching of
statistics or the development of statisticians was ignored.
The key to SPC is the measurement of the process and
management through statistical control. People must
understand the use and power of statistics before they can
use them to manage with.
In this command, facilitators hold the TQM organization
together at the working level. They direct the PATs and
provide guidance and interpretation of management principles.
Facilitators are highly motivated toward the success of TQM
and the command as a whole; and need to be constantly trained
and made aware of new developments.
Commander George Silverman is the present Production
Officer at the Depot. CDR Silverman is not only a member of
the EPB and the ESC but is a student of TQM as well. He
recommends a slice or pilot approach to implementation of
TQM. He says that timing is a crucial factor in
implementation. Once the upper and middle management has
adopted the TQM principles and is committed to its
implementation, the present environment at military
establishments requires one process be taken at a time.
Once an individual process is selected and used as a pilot,
it can be fenced or protected from the rest of the
organization. Since TQM requires total commitment, pilot
processes would not show their full potential for improvement
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unless segregated in some way from the old style of business.
There would be too many opportunities for "managerial
sabotage" of a system that threatened a change from the old
philosophies. (Silverman)
CDR Silverman further stated the need for a better
definition of the problem. The use of TQM involves the use
of statistics to identify, localize, and pinpoint the cause
of problems within the process. It is very easy to try to
solve the problem before the actual cause is finally
pinpointed. This leads to frustration when the process has
been "improved" yet no real productivity improvements can be
shown. It takes a great deal of patience to follow through
on all the steps to finally reach the point where the actual
cause of the problem is identified. It is important to
develop the patience to define the problem properly to avoid
the frustration and wasted efforts involved in "fixing" the
wrong problem.
CDR Silverman says a "critical mass" of highly motivated,
trained people are needed before the process can be
internalized and proceed by itself. The Depot has decided
that the critical mass of people will have the facilitators
and the ESC at its core. The number of people converted to
the TQM philosophy should increase as more people are trained
in external facilities. Once internal training programs and
a Process Improvement Training Model have been developed, the
number of people will continue to grow until the critical
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mass is achieved. The Depot continues to receive external
assistance from consultants and NPRDC in the area of training
and the development of a training model .( Silverman)
In the area of training, Capt O'Connor said that the key
to implementation of TQM is continuous training. He said you
must keep TQM in the people's minds, even if they are not
involved in the prototype effort. Training is an investment.
It requires the discipline and long range vision to sacrifice
short term gains for the betterment of the command in the
long run. Taking people away from their jobs and sending
them to training classes can be very frustrating to managers
who are still faced with internal deadlines. You need to
remember that the whole command will be more productive once
TQM has been fully implemented and the investment in training
will really start paying off. (O'Connor)
D. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED AT NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT, NORTH
ISLAND
1. Begin with broad-based TQM training at all levels of
the organization.
2. All levels of management must be committed to the TQM
management philosophies if the program is to succeed.
3. Review the internal organization structure to ensure
responsibility for implementation is given to an
organization with the dedication, authority, and
ability to complete the task.
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4. Revise employee review systems early in the
implementation process so people will be reviewed for
what you actually want them to do.
5. Select prototype or pilot processes for initial
implementation and continue with a "slice" approach
until all areas have been completed.
6. Once pilot processes have been selected, baseline the
process so improvements can be measured and results can
be more meaningful.
7. Even though the bulk of facilitators should be "home
grown", the use of external consultants for evaluation
and initial training is essential.
8. Upper management must be trained and their thinking
must be converted to the new methods as soon as they
arrive. The need for Constance of purpose in upper
management is paramount. Rotation of upper managers
must not be permitted to interrupt the process.
9. Ensure enough facilitators and internal support exists
before expanding the implementation process. It is
important to create the "critical mass" as early in the
process as possible.
10. Keep focused on the long term benefits of TQM. Do not
get discouraged by the length of time it takes to
change management philosophies. Do not allow upper




11. TQM involves Statistical Process Control (SPC) and a
cultural change in the way people and processes are
managed. Ensure both aspects receive equal attention.
You will not achieve the desired results without a full




IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A . RECOMMENDAT IONS
1. The rightful owner of TQM implementation is the EPB.
Either reduce the size of the EPB so they can be
effective or make the ESC a direct "line" organization
with control over the EPB.
TQM implementation must be one of DoD's highest
priorities. The only rightful place for it is with the
most senior and powerful organization in the command.
The EPB should be reporting the progress of TQM
implementation to the ESC; not the other way around.
2. Demonstrate a full understanding of the management
principles in the implementation process. Think of the
implementation of TQM as being the first process to be
improved. Organize a PAT to assist in the
implementation. Do not use numerical quotas, fear, or
employee evaluations for the tools of implementation.
3. It is upper management's responsibility to remove the
reliance on short-term goals from the organization.
Short term pressures still exist at all levels of the
organization, even in the TQM implementation process.
4. Do not allow a "TQM chain of command" to develop within
the organization. The only way a dual chain of command
could form is if implementation of TQM is allowed to be
other than the command's number one priority. Its
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emergence is an indicator that the TQM message is not
making its way down to the worker level of the
organization. Detection of a dual chain of command can
only signify a loss of constancy of purpose in the
upper levels of management.
5. Utilize Lewin's theory of management of change in areas
that still require implementation. People must be
dissatisfied with the status quo before they will be
receptive to any change. The unfreezing process Lewin
refers to can only be accomplished through constant
training and management attention.
6. It is management's responsibility to shield the
organization from the external pressures for short-term
results. This will probably prove to be the most
difficult of all tasks. Upper management will feel the
pressures for short-term results from the outside but
must not allow those pressures to influence their
commitment to their long term goals. Remember, that
frustration is now being felt at the first-line
supervisor level. It rightly belongs to upper
management.
7. The Depot has made tremendous gains in productivity and
cost reductions since the initial phases of
implementation. Do not allow yourselves to be
frustrated by the changes in pace in process
improvement. A total commitment to change is required.
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TQM involves a permanent change in management
philosophy. It is not something that can be "done and
forgotten". Keep improving the process. Continue the
training.
An overwhelming feeling of TQM commitment was felt
at all levels of the organization. The depot is
extremely close to reaching the "critical mass"
mentioned by Moen and Silverman. A change in the way
people approach problems was seen since the author left
the command in 1987. People are using process control
in their everyday problem solving; without even knowing
it!
B. CONCLUSIONS
Total Quality Management is not a radical departure from
generally accepted management principles. The philosophies
and procedures suggested by Deming does not represent a total
abandonment of "American" style management. Instead, the
basis of his philosophy is a "back to basics" approach. He
recommends a long term approach to planning, material
acquisition, production control, and personnel management.
TQM is one method being supported as a way for the United
States to recapture the share of the world markets lost to
the Japanese and other Asian and European countries. An
underlying fact of Deming' s philosophy is that the emphasis
on short term profits creates a downward spiral in quality
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and productivity, which leads to a decrease in overall
competitiveness. A reduction in competitiveness leads to a
decrease in long term profits and jeopardizes the future of
the company.
TQM emphasizes long term profits through increased
competitiveness and productivity. Increased competitiveness
and productivity are possible only with an emphasis on
quality and a reduction in scrap and rework.
The initial attempt to implement TQM at the Depot at
North Island was met with suspicion and resistance. While
TQM can be described as basic management, it was a dramatic
change from what managers were actually doing at the time.
Evaluation systems provided motivation to managers for short
term planning. The inevitable downward spiral would
hopefully be confronted by "someone else", typically after a
reorganization or transfer had occurred.
But the Depot was able to reduce their dependance on
short term results because they had the commitment of upper
management over the long term. Even though the
implementation process is not complete and the results have
been less than optimal, the use of TQM at the Depot has
produced favorable results and must be considered successful.
There is no doubt that additional increases in productivity
could be achieved by expanding the use of TQM at the Depot.
Additional processes need to be reviewed for inclusion in the
process. Additional effort must be made to comply with more
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of Deming's 14 points. Even though resistance to the
philosophies is still present, both within the organization
and in the form of external orders and regulations, the
success can be brought to other areas.
Other establishments can also benefit from the
implementation of TQM. The Depot has shown that
administrative organizations can benefit from TQM just as
effectively as organizations primarily involved in
production. The Depot provided an excellent example of the
versatility and adaptability of the TQM philosophies.
Productivity gains attributed to TQM were identified in
material requirements planning and mail receipt and delivery
as well as the more traditional area of production.
There was nothing peculiar to the Depot that would enable
TQM to succeed there where it would not succeed at some other
installation. Any organization can benefit from increased
productivity, regardless of their function or purpose. The
only essential characteristic for successful TQM
implementation is an intense and unwavering commitment by
upper management to improve the present system.
The results will not become apparent overnight. The
Depot has only recently reached the point where improvements
are being made without extreme pressure from upper
management. TQM implementation is a long term process that
can easily extend five to eight years, or even more. The
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Depot is in its fifth year under a commitment to TQM but it
has been almost nine years since its initial exposure.
The Depot can serve as a model for other activities
during their implementation of TQM. The lessons they learned
are included in this Thesis. Managers should review the
lessons learned within this Thesis and familiarize themselves
with Deming's "deadly diseases."
TQM can be implemented in any organization and any
organization can benefit from its implementation and use.
Only through the increased productivity made possible by TQM
can the United States compete with the rest of the industrial
nations for its rightful share of the world markets.
Implementation of Deming's principles at a military
organization can certainly pose additional problems not
normally faced in a non-military environment. Probably the
greatest problem in military organizations is turnover.
Normal military organizations experience a complete turnover
every three years. The constancy of purpose required to
successfully implement TQM is very difficult to achieve under
such circumstances. There is a constant need to "convert"
the thinking and management style of the newly reported
senior managers throughout the process. The need for
continuous training becomes critical as new people report for
duty.
The lessons learned from the Depot were presented with
the hope that, armed with the knowledge of the possible
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pitfalls, some of the lessons may not need to be repeated by
every organization attempting TQM implementation.
Management owns the responsibility of TQM implementation.
It is management's job to give the workers the tools needed
to perform the required task. TQM is a necessary tool, just
as a lathe is to a machinist, a typewriter is to an
administrative worker, or a drafting table is to a designer.
The tools of yesterday are not enough to produce the quality
required for the United States to compete in the world market
tomorrow. TQM is the additional tool. needed by the workers.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Total Quality Management (TQM) is a combination of
Statistical Process Control (SPC) and the management
philosophies attributed to Dr. W. Edwards Deming. TQM
is described in depth in Chapter II.
2. TQM has been implemented in all six of the Naval
Aviation Depots. Other commands have completed partial
implementation or have expressed interest in future
implementation. Recent directives issued by the
Secretary of Defense indicate a possible future
requirement for all DoD activities to implement TQM.
3. The implementation of TQM has been successful at the
Depot at North Island. Improvements in productivity
and processes are included in Chapter III.
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4. The lessons learned by the Depot at North Island have
value to any command attempting to implement the TQM
procedures. The Depot is not unlike many of the other
commands within the DoD. They share the same
restrictions and organizational problems. Lessons
learned by the Depot at North Island are included in
Chapter III.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
It is recommended that the other 5 Naval Aviation Depots
be compared to the Depot at North Island for consistency in
findings and experiences. A survey type questionnaire could
be developed from the information included in this thesis.
Other possible research areas regarding TQM could include
a survey of some of the commercial companies that have
completed implementation to verify the results gained from
the above recommendation and the results from the Depot at
North Island. The experience gained from the above
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